The Washington Post has long styled itself as a guardian of democracy. Yet in recent weeks, its actions have crossed into territory that no serious journalist should tread. By doxxing Cabinet officials of the Trump administration, the Post has not only abandoned professional norms but also placed lives in danger. The pattern is unmistakable. First, reporters revealed the location of DHS Secretary Kristi Noem’s Washington, D.C., apartment, forcing her to relocate. When she moved into undisclosed government housing, Marianne LeVine, Liz Goodwin, and Dan Lamothe published her new location on August 15, 2025. The decision drew broad criticism, yet the paper escalated. Five days later, Tara Copp, Alex Horton, and Dan Lamothe published another article, this time targeting the security detail of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. The repetition is telling. Lamothe, having already doxxed Secretary Noem, knew exactly what he was doing when he revealed operational details about Hegseth’s protective detail.
It might be argued that the Post did not publish specific home addresses for Secretary Hegseth or his family. But such a defense misses the point. In matters of security, the aggregation of operational details is itself a weapon. Each clue is a piece of intelligence. Strung together, they form a map for adversaries. The Post has supplied this map.
First, national security is directly compromised. By documenting the size, strength, and scope of Hegseth’s security, the Post handed foreign intelligence services and domestic extremists alike a trove of actionable insights. Hostile actors now know that the Army Criminal Investigation Division has diverted over 700 agents across multiple states to guard Hegseth and his family. Even without precise addresses, a trained adversary can deduce where protective coverage is stretched thin and where vulnerabilities might be exploited. This is a textbook case of what the military calls “negative target acquisition,” the art of striking where defenses are weakest by knowing where they are strongest.
Second, the Post has effectively designated Hegseth’s family as soft targets. The article repeatedly emphasizes that not only the Secretary but also his ex-wives and children receive protection. In so doing, it confirmed the value of those individuals as pressure points. Adversaries do not need direct coordinates to identify relatives. In an age of open-source sleuthing, the mere confirmation of who is guarded is enough to narrow the search. By signaling the protective net around Hegseth’s family, the Post elevated their threat profile dramatically.
Third, the disclosure is an unmistakable breach of operational security. OPSEC doctrine exists for a reason. Protective arrangements are classified not because they are embarrassing, but because secrecy is their shield. Once adversaries know which units are involved, how they are deployed, and how strained their resources are, the secrecy collapses. The Post did not merely describe costs in the abstract. It named the Army CID, described the diversion from criminal investigations, and charted the geographic spread of protection. From this, one can infer schedules, blind spots, and logistical weaknesses. This is not reporting, it is intelligence handoff.
Fourth, the Post’s framing of the story as an excess of privilege invites domestic retaliation. By characterizing Hegseth’s protection as extravagant and possibly improper, it seeds resentment among unstable individuals. Some readers, radicalized by the implication that taxpayer money is being wasted, may see themselves as justified vigilantes. In that sense, the article functions not only as disclosure but also as provocation. It hands both foreign and domestic actors a motive, means, and opportunity.
Finally, this reporting creates a dangerous precedent and reveals a double standard. Protective details for high-ranking officials have always been shielded from public exposure. The Secret Service, for instance, never publicly discloses coverage specifics for the Vice President or Secretary of State. The media typically respects that line. By crossing it, the Post normalizes the idea that operational details of protection are fair game. If this precedent stands, every Cabinet secretary, judge, or military leader may find themselves subject to similar disclosures. It erodes the very framework of security for our government.
The steelman conclusion is stark. While the Post did not publish addresses or agent names, it handed adversaries a blueprint. It mapped the protective apparatus around a sitting Secretary of Defense, flagged the weak points, and spotlighted family members as exploitable assets. This is not the work of a free press engaged in oversight. It is reckless endangerment masquerading as journalism.
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That they seed to the leftists for assults
So be it. What’s wrong is wrong, regardless of who does it. The only good government is clean and thrifty government.
And the same goes for journalists, bloggers, columnists, editorialists, etc. And “doxing” is just plain evil.
Doxxing is nont only evil, it is attempted murder. Charge and indict these treasonous
The left has become the arm of violence against America. Hollywood and the leftist media are the propagandists who stir them to despicable acts against all things American.
I am going out on a limb here just to be VERY clear; They are by Constitutional definition guilt of TREASON! 100%! The first Amendment offers certain guaranties as to speech; however, there are certain limits put on that speech by the Supreme Court. When that line is crossed it becomes treason.