What They’re Not Telling You About The Strait Of Hormuz

There is a narrative circulating with increasing ferocity across global media ecosystems, originating in Chinese state-aligned influence networks, amplified by Turkish, Russian, Palestinian, and Ukrainian accounts, and then laundered into supposed credibility by drive-by media outlets including The Wall Street Journal and CNN. The narrative goes something like this: President Trump and his Pentagon stumbled into Operation Epic Fury without adequate planning, were blindsided by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and are now scrambling to improvise a response to a crisis they should have anticipated. Every piece of that narrative is false, and each element of its falsity is documentable through primary sources, institutional doctrine, and decades of public congressional analysis. The goal of this op-ed is to dismantle that narrative with the methodological seriousness it does not deserve but that the moment demands.

Begin with the most basic and irrefutable point. The Strait of Hormuz has been an explicit U.S. war-planning problem since 1979. That is not a figure of speech. Following the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American policymakers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff treated the Persian Gulf as a decisive strategic vulnerability, and they linked that vulnerability specifically to the risk that an adversary might close the Strait. That concern was not incidental to US strategic planning in the region. It drove the creation of command architecture and a series of war plans designed precisely to deny adversary access to the Gulf. Anyone asserting that the Trump administration was caught unprepared for the Strait’s closure is asserting, whether they know it or not, that the entire post-1979 American strategic posture in the region never happened.

The documentary record does not permit that assertion. By the late 1980s, the United States had validated its contingency framework through live operational experience. The Tanker War of 1987 and 1988, culminating in Operation Praying Mantis, demonstrated the pattern that would become institutionally characteristic: multiple preapproved strike and retaliation contingencies, rapidly adapted after Iranian escalation at sea. The after-action analysis from Praying Mantis explicitly records that tactical air contingencies had already been tasked, planned, and approved by the Joint Chiefs before the mining incidents occurred. The forces adapted standardized options quickly once events broke. That is not improvisation. That is exactly what deliberate options production followed by adaptive execution is supposed to look like.

In 2012, the Congressional Research Service produced a formal analysis of Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz that laid out closure and harassment scenarios in granular detail, described outright closure as likely to trigger a U.S. and coalition military response, and quoted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin Dempsey, directly. Dempsey stated that Iran could block the Strait “for a period of time,” but added that the United States had invested in capabilities to defeat that capability. That is a senior military officer, in public congressional testimony, describing a planned and resourced mission to reopen the Strait under fire. The claim that the Trump administration had no plan for a closure scenario requires one to believe that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was describing a capability that somehow evaporated in the fourteen years between 2012 and 2026. That is not a serious argument.

Consider next the institutional machinery through which military options actually reach a president. Joint Publication 5-0, which governs joint planning doctrine, is explicit on this point. At the strategic level, joint planning exists to provide the President and the Secretary of Defense with options and advice, and planning supports decision-making specifically by identifying courses of action with outcomes, costs, and risks already assessed. The CJCS Guide 3130, which describes the joint planning and execution enterprise as it actually functions, states that the enterprise informs the entire chain of command from the President down to facilitate informed decisions on the employment of military force. Those are not aspirational statements. They describe a continuously operating institutional system that exists for no purpose other than ensuring that a president does not face a major operational decision without a menu of vetted options.

On the interagency side, National Security Presidential Memorandum 1, signed on January 20, 2025, establishes that the National Security Advisor is responsible for ensuring that necessary papers are prepared and that presidential decisions are recorded and communicated. What this means in practice is that military options generated by the Joint Staff and the combatant commands are packaged, staffed through the NSC process, and presented to the President through a structured deliberative channel. The “no plan” allegation, applied to a president operating inside that system, is not merely wrong. It conflicts with the documented purpose and mechanics of the institutional apparatus itself.

The critics who push this narrative, and the propagandists who created it, either do not understand how American military planning works or they understand it perfectly well and are counting on their audiences not to. The Chinese Communist Party’s information apparatus, amplified across 𝕏 and other platforms through Turkish, Russian, Palestinian, and Ukrainian proxy accounts, has a clear interest in portraying the operation as chaotic and the Trump administration as reckless. This serves multiple purposes simultaneously. It degrades confidence in U.S. deterrence globally. It encourages Iran to hold firm by suggesting that American public opinion is fracturing. It pressures European governments to distance themselves from Washington. And it provides domestic critics in the U.S. with a seemingly credible frame to attack the President during an active military operation. The useful idiots at CNN and The Wall Street Journal do not have to be ideological co-conspirators to serve this function. All they need to do is launder the narrative into mainstream discourse by treating foreign-originated framing as if it constitutes independent analysis.

The Hormuz closure itself, which Iran declared effective March 4, 2026, was not a surprise any more than rain in Seattle is a surprise. Iranian officials have threatened Strait closure repeatedly across decades, and that threat has been publicly catalogued in congressional analysis, defense journals, and war games. CRS reporting from March 2026 treats the closure as a planned coercive instrument, noting that Iran has described the closure as leverage and that U.S. capacity to restore shipping has always been assessed as variable in duration depending on the Iranian method employed, ranging from days to months. The point is that reopening the Strait under fire is a known mission with known variables. Duration uncertainty is not the same as planning absence.

The operational sequencing that critics describe as improvised is, in fact, the sequencing that practical reopening logic has always required. First, you suppress the dominant threats, which in the current conflict are Iranian ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones. CENTCOM has reported that Iran has launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and thousands of one-way attack drones since February 28, and that launch rates have declined as U.S. and partner forces degrade those capabilities. Second, you strike the minelaying enterprise. Current reporting confirms that strikes are targeting both the missile systems and the infrastructure used to deploy mines in the Strait. Third, once conditions are safer, you scale escort and convoy operations. USNI reporting from March 2026 explicitly describes the Pentagon working through exactly this sequencing, with officials noting that escort transits will be scaled when doing so is safe and smart rather than as a political demonstration that ignores threat reality. That is not the behavior of a command caught unprepared. That is the behavior of a command working a pre-built operational framework under pressure.

The mine countermeasures piece deserves particular attention because it is where critics have tried hardest to manufacture a credibility problem. The U.S. Navy established Commander Task Force 52 in the Fifth Fleet area of operations in 2009, 17 years before the current conflict, precisely to coordinate mine warfare assets and maintain readiness for maritime denial scenarios. That task force was established without deploying additional units because the assets to man it were already operating in theater. A subsequent release describes it as a multinational task force with continuous tasking in the Fifth Fleet area of operations. In September 2025, the Navy publicly acknowledged transitioning from Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships to mine-capable Littoral Combat Ship deployments and identified the relevant commands tasked with the mine mission. Critics who point to that transition as evidence of unpreparedness are conflating a force-mix decision, which can be legitimately debated, with the absence of a plan, which is a factually different and far stronger claim than the evidence supports.

Budget and staffing data reinforce the same conclusion from a different angle. FY2026 Joint Staff Operations and Maintenance documentation shows total Joint Staff O&M in the range of $1.57B, with a Joint Staff “Operations” subcomponent of approximately $414.1M. Those figures are not broken out by theater or scenario, but they are strong public indicators that the institutional machinery responsible for integrating planning, options production, and execution support is continuously and substantially resourced. A GAO analysis found that CENTCOM’s authorized military and civilian positions rose approximately 70% between FY2001 and FY2013, from roughly 1,590 to 2,730, and that the headquarters was further augmented by temporary personnel and contractors. The theater planning apparatus is not small, not ad hoc, and not new. The more plausible default hypothesis is that a president operating inside this system received too many pre-built options rather than too few.

None of this means that every operational decision in Epic Fury is optimal, that every risk was perfectly weighted, or that the transition away from Avenger-class MCM ships introduced no uncertainty into the mine-warfare posture. Honest steelmanning does not require asserting perfection. It requires establishing that the “no plan” and “no contingency” narrative is evidentially weak and propagandistically motivated. On those two claims, the evidence is unambiguous.

What the propagandists, the useful idiots, and the hostile foreign information apparatus are collectively doing is exploiting the gap between classified operational reality and what can be publicly confirmed. The exact contents of the options packages delivered to President Trump, the classified inventory of strike and reopening plans, and the specific number of planners dedicated to Hormuz contingencies at any given moment are not public. That uncertainty is real. But epistemically, it is a two-way street. The absence of public confirmation is not evidence of absence. And the publicly documented record, spanning four decades of institutional investment, congressional analysis, standing mine warfare commands, joint planning doctrine, and NSC process design, makes the “no plan” allegation extraordinarily implausible on its face.

The Chinese propaganda machine is sophisticated. Its amplification network across Turkish, Russian, Palestinian, and Ukrainian accounts is well-resourced. The European commentariat, reflexively skeptical of American power projection, provides a ready audience. And the American media outlets that launder these narratives, perhaps without fully understanding their origin or function, provide the false credibility that allows the narrative to circulate in respectable company. None of that makes the narrative true. Operation Epic Fury was not launched blind. The Strait of Hormuz was not an afterthought. The Pentagon did not stumble. The planning was real, the institutions were prepared, and the sequencing being executed is the sequencing that strategic logic and decades of war-planning have always required. The people telling you otherwise have reasons for doing so, and those reasons have nothing to do with honest military analysis.

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