Maryland’s Governor Doesn’t Understand The Chain Of Command

It is an iron rule of American federalism that certain powers rest with the states until, by explicit constitutional and statutory design, they do not. Among these is the command of a state’s National Guard. The Maryland National Guard, like all state Guards, exists in a dual status. In its ordinary configuration, it answers to the governor. Yet, under conditions set by federal law, it can be brought into federal service, answering only to the president of the United States. This is not a matter of opinion. It is black letter law.

Governor Wes Moore’s recent statements on national television obscure this reality. Speaking to MSNBC and CNN, Moore declared, “I will not authorize the usage of the Maryland National Guard for any mission that I do not deem to be mission critical or mission aligned. I will not authorize it, and it will not happen.” The rhetoric may stir partisan pride, but it is legally inaccurate. The governor does not possess an absolute veto over the Guard’s deployment. Once federalized, the Guard is removed from state control entirely. In such circumstances, the governor’s consent is not required, and his opposition is irrelevant.

To understand why this is so, one must first be clear on the constitutional and statutory framework. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, reserving to the states the appointment of officers and the authority to train according to federal standards. The modern National Guard is the statutory heir of that militia. It operates under a dual enlistment system: Guardsmen serve both the state and the federal government. They can be called to state service under state law or to federal service under U.S. law.

In state service, the governor is the commander-in-chief. Maryland’s own code, in Public Safety § 13-702, specifies that the governor may order the militia to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, enforce laws, or respond to emergencies. When the Guard is in this status, the president has no operational role unless a federal mobilization order is issued.

The transformation occurs under Title 10 of the US Code. Title 10 permits the president to “federalize” a state’s Guard. Once this happens, Guardsmen become indistinguishable in chain of command from active duty forces. They report through the Department of Defense, ultimately to the president as commander-in-chief. The governor’s legal authority over them is suspended for the duration of the federal mission.

The conditions under which the president may do this are not confined to declared wars. The Insurrection Act, codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255, allows the president to deploy the Guard if insurrection, domestic violence, or unlawful obstruction prevents the enforcement of federal law, or if such action is needed to protect civil rights. This power can be exercised with or without a state’s request, depending on circumstances. Moreover, under 10 U.S.C. § 12304 and related statutes, the Guard can be activated for national emergencies, overseas operations, or to fulfill specific federal missions.

History offers ample precedent. Presidents have federalized state Guards during desegregation crises, as when President Eisenhower sent the Arkansas National Guard into federal service to enforce court orders in Little Rock in 1957. Governors who resisted were powerless to stop it. The chain of command was, and remains, unambiguous: in state service, Guard units answer to the governor; in federal service, they answer to the president.

One might ask whether a governor could simply refuse to cooperate in a federalization order. The answer is no. Once the legal order is issued, Guardsmen are bound by their federal oath. Refusal to obey would place them in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The governor has no lawful means to countermand federal orders to units or personnel who have been placed in Title 10 status.

Governor Moore’s assertion that “it will not happen” if he disapproves reflects either a misunderstanding of the law or an attempt to cultivate a political image of defiance. But legal authority is not a matter of personal will. It is determined by the Constitution and by statutes passed by Congress. The danger of such rhetoric lies in misleading the public about who commands the Guard under federalization. In a moment of national crisis, clarity of command is not optional. Misstating it can erode public trust and confuse both soldiers and civilians about where lawful orders originate.

Even when in state service, the Maryland National Guard is integrated into the broader U.S. military structure. Its equipment, training, and much of its funding come from the federal government. Its units must meet federal readiness standards. The National Guard Bureau, a joint activity of the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, ensures that all state Guards remain capable of rapid integration into federal operations. This embedded federal role underscores why the president’s authority to mobilize is real, immediate, and not contingent on gubernatorial consent.

It is true that most Guard missions occur under state control, and in many cases federal authorities coordinate with governors before federalizing units. But this is a matter of prudence, not necessity. The law imposes no requirement that the president obtain a governor’s blessing before mobilizing the Guard. Once mobilized, the Guardsmen no longer fall within the governor’s chain of command. For the duration of their federal service, they are active duty troops.

This division of authority was designed deliberately. The Founders feared both the tyranny of a distant centralized military and the incapacity of states to defend themselves or the nation in emergencies. The result is a dual system that preserves local control in peacetime yet allows for unified national command when the stakes demand it. The governor’s authority is genuine, but it is limited. The president’s authority, once triggered, is supreme.

Those limits are worth stating plainly. In state service, the governor commands the Guard through the adjutant general of Maryland, down to unit commanders and individual Guardsmen. In federal service, the president commands through the secretary of defense, then the service secretaries, then operational commanders. The governor is cut out of the chain entirely. This is the law, not a suggestion.

If Governor Moore wishes to resist a federal mobilization on policy grounds, his remedy lies in political persuasion or litigation, not in an outright refusal to acknowledge the president’s lawful authority. The latter would not only be legally baseless but could trigger a constitutional confrontation in which the governor is certain to lose. In times of crisis, such performative defiance is dangerous. It risks undermining the readiness and cohesion of forces whose effectiveness depends on a clear and uncontested chain of command.

Americans should expect their leaders to tell them the truth about the scope of their authority. In the case of the National Guard, the truth is that no governor can guarantee that “it will not happen” when the president has determined otherwise. The constitutional design does not allow for such absolutism at the state level. Nor should it, for the unity of command in moments of national peril is not a partisan preference. It is a necessity.

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